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INTRODUCTION
This paper considers a specific question that has been highlighted in recent years by the growing concern over the operations of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). How and to what extent should 
MNEs be subject to specialised regulation through laws 
and rules relating to their activities as cross-border 
corporate groups? In particular, should parent companies 
be directly responsible for the acts of their overseas 
subsidiaries by reason of specific rules of liability for those 
acts? Furthermore, should MNE groups be more 
accountable for their operations by reason of disclosure 
and governance systems that are adapted to the 
transnational nature of those operations? Such questions 
would appear to be exactly of the kind that a 
comprehensive review of company law should be 
addressing, if it is to be rooted in the realities of increased 
international economic integration encouraged by the 
transnational business practices of MNEs.
In the event, and rather surprisingly, the Company Law 
Review Steering Group had little to say on these very 
important questions. Indeed, the issue of corporate groups 
was introduced only at a later stage in the Review process 
and consisted of a single chapter in the November 2000 
Consultation Document Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy  Completing the Structure (DTI, London, 
November 2000, Chap. 10)   hereafter Completing the 
Structure. In that chapter, there is little said by the Steering 
Group on the specific question of group liability for 
tortious acts of affiliates, let alone on the specific problems 
surrounding MNE accountability. More strikingly, the Final
Report of the Steering Group, published on 26 July 2001, 
contains nothing on corporate groups. Neither the 
Foreword, nor the opening chapter on 'Guiding Principles, 
Methods and Output', offers any explanation for this 
omission (see The Company Law Steering Group, Modern 
Company Law Jor a competitive Economy Final Report, (DTI, 
London, 2001), Vol.1   hereafter Final Report). In the 
meantime, litigation involving the liability of UK-based 
parent companies for the acts of their overseas subsidiaries 
has been instituted, and is continuing, before the English 
courts, raising precisely the kinds of issues outlined above. 
The principal cases, which involve Cape Pic and Thor 
Chemicals as defendants, arose out of the operations of the 
subsidiaries of these English-based parent companies in 
South Africa. In the Cape case, the litigation has arisen out 
of the exposure of large numbers of employees and local 
residents to asbestos mining and milling operations 
undertaken by the subsidiaries of Cape, with attendant 
consequences to the health of the claimants (see further 
Peter Muchlinski, 'Corporations in International 
Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United 
Kingdom Asbestos Case' (2001) 50 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1). In the Thor case, the parent 
company has been pursued for the exposure of employees 
in its South African subsidiaries to highly toxic chemical 
processes that are in fact unlawful in the United Kingdom, 
but which were moved out of the English jurisdiction to 
South Africa (see Richard Meeran, 'Liability of 
Multinational Corporations: A Critical Stage in the UK' in 
Liability of Multinational Corporations Under International Law 
(Menno Kamminga and Sam Zia-Zarifi ed., Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2000), p. 251).
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The question of holding MNEs to legal account for the 
consequences of their unlawful actions has been a 
recurring theme in litigation over the past two decades. 
MNEs, in common with all advanced enterprises, whether 
national or multinational, have the potential to harm very 
large numbers of people through the use of hazardous 
technologies. However, unlike national enterprises, MNEs 
apply such technologies in their worldwide operations. 
Where such a technology injures people in the overseas 
location in which it is used, this may lead to transnational 
mass tort litigation, as was the case in relation to the 
Bhopal accident in India in 1984. Indeed, the 
consequences of this litigation have yet to be finally 
resolved some 17 years on (for regular updates on the 
current legal situation in the continuing litigation visitto to to
http://www.bhopal.net/legal.html).
It is the aim of this paper to analyse the principal legal 
and policy issues raised by such cases, as seen in the 
context of the business and industrial organisation of 
MNEs (see further Muchlinsk, Multinational Enterprises and 
the Law (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, revised paperback 
edition, 1999) at Chapters 3, 9 and 10). It is in the context 
of this analysis that the work of the Company Law Review 
Steering Group will be considered. Though, as already 
noted, the wider discussion of corporate governance and 
accountability in relation to groups was rather limited, the 
Steering Group did offer a view on the question of group 
liability in tort and also considered the question of 
accountability, in particular, by suggesting some new 
methods of group governance based on the concept of an 
'elective' regime for groups. These matters will be 
examined more closely in the third section of the paper, as 
will the likely reasons for the Steering Group's reticence 
on these important issues.
Before that is done, the paper will begin with an 
overview of the conceptual issue of MNE parent company 
liability for the tortious acts of its affiliates, with a view to 
the development of possible arguments concerning the 
existence of a duty of care on the part of parent companies 
of a MNE for the infliction of personal injuries upon 
claimants at the hands of their overseas subsidiaries. This 
demands an excursus into the literature on the 
organisation of MNEs. That literature is vast. 
Furthermore, there is no single definitive theory of the 
growth and operation of MNEs, whether in economics, 
business studies or economic and business history. 
However, certain general themes can be identified and 
these can be used to structure an argument for the 
existence of the above-mentioned duty of care.
Attention will then turn to the issues raised by the recent 
United Kingdom litigation. Thus far judicial decisions have 
dealt with only one of the two principal issue areas around 
which MNE group liability is determined, namely, 
jurisdiction over the parent to answer for the acts of its 
overseas subsidiary in the host country where the alleged
harm is suffered. The second question, that of the 
existence of a duty of care and of group liability for harm 
caused by overseas subsidiaries to overseas claimants, has 
yet to be decided, at least under English law. A decision on 
this issue of substance is unlikely in the near future. The 
Cape litigation will not be heard until April 2002 (see 
'Date set for South African miner's battle with UK firm', 
The Observer, 27 May 2001, p. 6). Indeed, such cases rarely 
come to a final decision on the merits as, once jurisdiction 
is accepted, the case will often go to settlement. This 
occurred in the Bhopal litigation and in Thor Chemicals. 
Accordingly there is a dearth of judicial pronouncement on 
this matter and much remains in the realm of speculation 
based on the existing state of the law, and on what that law 
should be, but see for an exceptional decision finding 
MNE parent liable for the acts of its overseas subsidiaries 
The Amoco Cadiz [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 304, and for a 
decision holding that the parent cannot be liable due to its 
separate corporate existence from the subsidiary Briggs v 
James Hardie &Co Pty (1989) 16 NSWLR 549. Thus, in the 
third part of this paper, the wider questions of MNE 
accountability will be examined in the light of the general 
question posed above and, as mentioned, in the light of the 
views of the Steering Group.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE 
BUSINESS ORGANISATION OF MNES
In order to determine whether a parent company should 
be liable for the tortious acts of its subsidiary, it is 
necessary to prove that, on the basis of the relationship 
between them, the parent can justifiably be held so liable. In 
legal terms that requires proof, either, that the parent has 
acted as a joint tortfeasor with its subsidiary, as in The 
Amoco Cadiz, or, that the subsidiary acted as the agent or 
alter ego of the parent when committing the alleged tort. In 
either case the evidential basis for such a finding will 
emerge from the actual business organisation of the MNE.to o
Thus, in order to develop a clear theory of parent company 
responsibility, it is, first, necessary to understand 
something of that organisation.to to
A good starting point is to review certain common 
definitions of MNEs (see further Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law, mentioned above, pp. 12-15). 
These have moved from a simple definition of MNEs as 
'corporations.... which have their home in one country but 
which operate and live under the laws and customs of 
other countries as well' (definition by David Lillienthal, 
quoted by D K Fieldhouse in 'The Multinational: a critique 
of a concept', Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective 
(Teichova et al. ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1986), p. 10), to a more economic 
conception as any enterprise which, 'owns (in whole or in 
part), controls and manages income generating assets in 
more than one country' (see N Hood and S Young, The 
Economics of the Multinational Enterprise (Longmans, London,
Amicus Curiae Issue 39 January/February 2002
1979), p. 3. See also J H Dunning, Multinational Enterprises 
and the Global Economy (Addison-Wesley, Wokingham, 
1993), pp. 3-4 and Richard Caves, Multinational Enterprise 
and Economic Analysis (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996), p. 1). This last definition distinguishes 
an enterprise that engages in direct investment   that is 
investment which gives the enterprise not only a financial 
stake in the foreign venture but also managerial control   
from one that engages in portfolio investment, which gives the 
investing enterprise only a financial stake in the foreign 
venture without any managerial control. Thus the MNE is 
a firm that engages in direct investment outside its home country. 
The term 'enterprise' is favoured over 'corporation' as it 
avoids restricting the object of study to incorporated 
business entities and to corporate groups based on 
parent/subsidiary relations alone. International 
production can take numerous legal forms. From an 
economic perspective the legal form is not crucial to the 
classification of an enterprise as 'multinational' (see 
Muchlinski, mentioned above, p. 12).
The most recent general definition of MNEs can be 
found in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
revised in Tune 2000. According to this definition suchJ o
enterprises:
' ... usually comprise companies or other entities established in 
more than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate 
their operations in various ways. While one or more of these 
entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the 
activities of others, their degree oj autonomy within the enterprise 
may vary widelyJrom one multinational enterprise to another. 
Ownership may be private, state or mixed.'
(The above definition can be found in OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, I Concepts and 
Principles, 27 June 200, para. 3: see 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/mnetext.htm at p. 
3. For the old version of this paragraph see OECD 
Guidelines 1991 Review (OECD, Paris, 1994, 1997) and 
Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, mentioned 
above, p. 13. The old version of this definition, which 
stressed control even more strongly by way of reference to 
the ability of one company to control the activities of 
another company located in another country, had been 
substantially adopted in the final version of the proposed 
text of the now shelved United Nations Draft Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Enterprises, UN Doc. No. 
E/1990/94 (12 June 1990), para. 1 at p. 5.)
The crucial characteristic of a MNE is, according to the 
above definition, the ability to co-ordinate activities 
between enterprises in more than one country. Other 
factors are not decisive. The definition is therefore, broad 
enough to encompass both equity and non-equity -based 
direct investment, regardless of the legal form, or 
ownership structure, of the undertakings. It also reflects 
the more recent trend in academic literature to move away
from a simple, classical model of the MNE as a hierarchical 
'pyramid' with the parent as the directing 'brain' of the 
company and the subsidiaries as its subordinate organs, 
with emphasis on line management though divisionalised 
corporate structures, towards a more flexible 
organisational form where subsidiaries are given more 
initiative over major decisions and to which significant 
strategic functions may be devolved. In addition, these 
more recent models stress the trend in more modern 
industries, that are not so dependent on economies of 
scale in manufacturing, to develop more open 
'hierarchical' management structures and more readily to 
establish strategic alliances with other firms as and where
o
necessary. For a general overview of the early and more 
recent thinking on MNE business organisation see: 
Muchlinski, mentioned above, pp.57-61, Dunning, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Chaps 8 and 
9, and Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, 
Chap. 3. As an example of the early approach see further 
D Channon & M Jalland, Multinational Strategic Planning 
(MacMillan Press, Eondon, 1979), Chap. 2. A leading 
statement of the more recent 'hierarchical' approach is C 
Bartlett and S Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders: The 
Transnational Solution (Century Business, 1989), Part I, 
pp. 1-71. Also useful is Hedlund, 'The Hypermodern 
MNC: a hierarchy?' (1986) 25 Human Resource 
Management, pp.9-36, which some see as the first paper to 
use this term. Julian Birkinshaw stresses a new 'Internal 
Market' perspective on MNE management in his new work 
Entrepreneurship in the Global Form (Eondon, Sage 
Publications, 2000) especially at Chapters 1 and 8.
This trend towards more open types of business 
organisation has given rise to two further developments in 
thinking on the business organisation of MNEs. First, the 
earlier theories of MNE growth have tended to explain the 
growth of the hierarchically integrated MNE. (General 
overviews of the various early theories of MNE growth can 
be found in: Muchlinsky, Multinational Enterprises and the 
Law, mentioned above, Chaps 2 and 3; Dunning, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Chaps 3 and 
4: Hood and Young, The Economics of the Multinational
' CV J
Enterprise, Chaps 1 and 2; Caves, Multinational Enterprise and 
Economic Analysis, Chaps 1-3. For a very useful discussion of 
the major trends in economic theory concerning the 
growth of MNEs that is accessible to non-economists see: 
C Pitelis and R Sugden, The Nature of the Transnational Firm 
(Routledge, Eondon, 1991) especially John Cantwell: 'A 
Survey of Theories of International Production', p. 17. 
Also useful is Geoffrey Jones, The Evolution of International 
Business (Routledge, Eondon, 1996), Chap. 1). They 
emphasise the ownership of specific competitive 
advantages by firms, the locational advantages of 
investment destinations and the 'internalisation' of 
markets into the corporate group of the MNE on the basis 
of the lower transaction costs that such a strategy offers. 
(Professor John Dunning has brought these approaches
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together into the so-called 'eclectic paradigm' of MNE 
growth. Professor Dunning explains the 'eclectic 
paradigm' in his textbook mentioned above. For further 
readings see: J Dunning, International Production and the 
Multinational Enterprise (Alien and Unwin, London, 1981), 
Chaps 1 and 2; J Dunning, Explaining International 
Production (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988) especially at 
Introduction and Chaps 2 and 12).
Such theories are being modified so that they can be 
made more useful in explaining the emergence of co- 
operative relationships between firms. Thus, for example, 
according to Professor Dunning, strategic alliances arise so 
that the competitive advantages of the participating firms 
can be combined through the new co-operative form of 
the enterprise, which then behaves much like a single 
integrated business, taking advantage of its collectively 
internalised advantages in global markets. (Professor 
Dunning has adapted the 'eclectic paradigm' in relation to 
strategic alliances in Alliance Capitalism and Global Business 
(Routledge, 1997) of which Chapter 3 provides a useful 
summary). Secondly, both among economists and business 
management experts, there is now a shift in emphasis away 
from theories of why MNEs develop in the first place, and 
how they tackle the problems of managing an evolving 
multinational business, to questions of how already 
established MNEs further develop and manage their 
operations. (Thus Mark Casson emphasises the need for a 
new research agenda that looks at the flexibility of MNEs 
in relation to global economic stimuli of his new edited 
book Economics of International Business: A New Research 
Agenda (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000). See also 
Birkinshaw mentioned above, at Chap. 7).
How is this knowledge to be used when constructing
o o
arguments for and against the creation of duties of care 
incumbent on parent companies for the acts if their 
subsidiaries? From the perspective of the United Kingdom 
litigation in Cape, the business organisation of this firm at 
the time relevant for the contested claims would have been 
that of a hierarchical parent-subsidiary group, typical of 
early MNEs operating in high risk, capital-intensive 
extraction industries where economies of scale are 
important (see further Jones, mentioned above, at Chap. 3. 
The corporate organisation of Union Carbide Corporation 
in the Bhopal case displayed similar characteristics. See 
further Muchlinski, 'The Bhopal Case: Controlling Ultra 
hazardous Industrial Activities Undertaken by Foreign 
Investors' (1987) 50 Modem Law Review 545). Cape thus 
appears to fit into the theoretical model of the closely 
controlled, managerially centralised, MNE. On the other 
hand, the defendants have maintained that their operations 
were devolved to their South African affiliates in 1948. 
Thus, they may wish to argue that their corporate structure 
fitted more into the 'hierarchical' model of more recent 
literature, with considerable autonomy being granted to 
local managers. (See further Birkinshaw, mentioned above).
Although such an argument may not be historically 
accurate, it may impress a court.
Against this background, caution needs to be exercised 
on how contemporary ideas on the business organisation 
of MNEs should be used when constructing legal duties of 
care. First, much of the more recent literature on open 
and flexible forms of corporate organisation relates 
primarily to newer high technology industries such as 
information technology or advanced product manufacture. 
It does not relate to older forms of MNE organisation, 
which might still appear before the court. Thus, when 
reviewing evidence of the business organisation of the
o o
defendant MNE, sweeping generalisations, based on a 
literal reading of the academic literature, about the 
'general' organisation of MNEs should be avoided. At most
o o
such literature can offer models of business organisation 
against which the defendant enterprise's actual 
organisation may be compared. Secondly, none of the 
more recent literature predicts the imminent end of the 
hierarchical multinational corporate group, just that this 
form of enterprise has a specific application to specific 
industries. (See Birkinshaw and Muchlinski, mentioned 
above, p. 60). Thirdly, even if it can be shown that the 
defendant MNE operates a devolved management system, 
or is part of a wider alliance of co-operating companies, 
this does not, of itself, deny the existence of a duty of care 
on the part of the MNE parent towards employees of its 
subsidiaries (or of co-operating firms in an alliance), or to 
members of the local community in the host country 
adversely affected by the operations of the enterprise. A 
direct duty of care may exist on the part of the parent (or 
the controlling enterprise [s] in an alliance) on the basis of 
general principles of tort, regardless of the precise business 
organisation of the enterprise, where, as a matter of policy, 
it is thought important for the duty to exist. Equally, 
liability for certain ultra-hazardous activities may be strict 
and the need for proving the existence of a duty of care 
may be unnecessary (as in the Indian doctrine of absolute 
enterprise liability for ultra-hazardous activities; see 
Muchlinski above in The Bhopal Case).
Thus it is not possible to offer wide and absolute 
concepts of MNE organisation. On the other hand, the law 
may develop through the use of presumptions as to the 
nature of corporate organisation, which may be rebutted 
on the provision of evidence to the contrary. For example, 
it may be presumed that a parent company, which owns 
100 per cent of the stock in its subsidiary controls that 
subsidiary and may therefore be further presumed to 
direct its activities unless there is evidence to the contrary. 
Equally, the law could presume strict liability on the part of 
the parent for the acts of its subsidiary unless it can be 
shown that the chain of causation has been broken in some 
way. Such approaches are not unproblematic. In particular, 
they challenge the advantage of limited liability implicit in 
the corporate separation between parent and subsidiary
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(see further Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the 
Law, pp. 331-2). However, as will be shown below, when 
the existence of a duty of care is considered further, such 
an argument may, in fact, misapprehend the true meaning, 
and legitimate boundaries of, limited liability in a group 
enterprise context.
THE CONTEXT: THE CAPE AND THOR 
CHEMICALS LITIGATION
Two main issues arise in relation to litigation involving 
alleged breaches of a duty of care on the part of a parent 
company for the acts of its overseas subsidiaries: first, does 
the forum before which the case has been brought have 
jurisdiction to hear the case, and, second, is the parent 
company liable for the alleged breach of the duty of care? 
As noted in the introduction, the current English litigation 
has been concerned mainly with the first question, while 
the second question awaits a judicial pronouncement. 
Each issue will now be considered in turn.
Jurisdiction
The first issue to be dealt with in all the recent cases 
involving English-based parent companies has been that of 
jurisdiction: were the English courts the proper place for 
the litigation on the merits of the case to be heard? In all
o
of these cases jurisdiction before the English courts was 
available 'as of right' because all the defendant companies 
are domiciled in England. That is: Cape, Thor Chemicals 
and Rio Tinto Zinc. See also Connelly v RTZ Pic [1998] AC 
854, which has had a significant bearing on the Cape 
litigation. In the Thor Chemicals litigation, the English 
courts prior to the settlement of the case accepted 
jurisdiction for £l .3million in 1997 (see Ngcobo et al. v Thor 
Chemicals Holdings [1995] TER 579. A further 21 claims are 
now in progress against Thor. Again jurisdiction was 
accepted; see Sithole et al. v Thor Chemicals Holdings [1999] 
TER 110). However, in the Cape litigation, the matter 
proved to be more problematic. Cape argued that, as 
South Africa was the place where the alleged harm had 
occurred it was the correct forum for the case to be heard. 
Thus, the main issue was whether England or South Africa 
was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine in 
Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansukx Ltd [1987] AC 460. 
The Spiliada doctrine has two limbs: First, taking account 
of all the circumstances and, especially, the nature of the 
subject matter and the convenience of the parties, which 
forum is the more appropriate for the action to be heard? 
Secondly, notwithstanding that a forum other than the 
English forum may be the more appropriate, will 
substantive justice be achieved by the hearing of the case in 
that other forum?
Different courts involved in these claims arrived at 
different conclusions. In the first set of claims, that were 
brought in 1997 by Rachel Eubbe and five others, South 
Africa was held to be the proper forum at first instance,
though this was overturned on appeal to the Court of 
Appeal in Lubbe v Cape Pic (No. 1) [1999] IE Pr 113. Then 
in January 1999, Hendrik Afrika and 1538 others 
commenced their claims. In July 1999 BuckleyJ reopened 
the jurisdiction issues in Eubbe et al. while hearing the 
Afrika class action cases. He found for a South African 
forum in Lubbe v Cape Pic [2000] 1 Eloyd's Rep 139, p. 
141, QBD. In November 1999 a second Court of Appeal 
upheld Buckley J on South African forum and on his 
approval of US public-interest criteria in US case law on 
forum issues in Lubbe v Cape Pic (No. I) [2000] 1 Eloyd's 
Rep 139, CA. On 20 July 2000 the House of Eords 
overturned the second Court of Appeal decision and 
upheld the first Court of Appeal decision under the second 
limb of the Spiliada doctrine: substantial justice could not 
be done in South Africa, even though there were factors7 o
that could point to the South African forum in Lubbe v Cape 
Pic (No.2) [2000] 1 WER 1545, HE.
In arriving at its decision the House of Eords was asked 
to consider three sets of questions: first, what was the 
scope of the Spiliada doctrine in the context of MNE 
operations; secondly, should the Brussels Convention on Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments with its emphasis on the principle 
of jurisdiction over corporations based on domicile, be 
mandatory in all cases, including cases brought by 
claimants from Non-Convention countries, as in the 
present case; and, thirdly, should the English courts take 
into account public policy considerations when 
determining whether jurisdiction should be exercised over 
English based parent companies for the alleged torts 
committed by their subsidiaries in another country (see 
now Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December2000 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters OJ [2001] E 12/1. The 
Regulation supersedes the Convention for Member States. 
It enters force on 1 March 2002).
As to the first question, the House of Eords did not go 
so far as to accept enterprise analysis under the first limb 
of Spiliada, and conclude that, as an integrated MNE, Cape 
Pic was a proper party to the proceedings as a result of its 
actual or potential control over the health and safety 
activities of its overseas subsidiaries. Instead, the House of 
Eords came to its conclusion by relying on the second limb 
of Spiliada and finding that, in the light of the evidence 
submitted by the claimants, and by the Government of 
South Africa in its special submission to the House of 
Eords, the claimants' case was very unlikely ever to be 
heard in South Africa due to, in particular, the absence of 
legal aid and of lawyers expert enough and willing to take 
on such a complex mass tort action. That would, in effect, 
take away the claimants' right to a hearing. In this their 
Eordships were following the approach taken in the earlier 
case of Connelly v RTZ Pic [1998] AC 854, where the 
absence of legal aid in the foreign forum (Namibia) was 
held to have been a significant factor pointing to the 
conclusion that substantial justice could not have been
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achieved there, notwithstanding that the foreign forum 
may have been more appropriate on the basis of the first 
limb test. Therefore, it would appear that the House of 
Lords are developing a 'due process' approach to the 
second limb of the Spiliada doctrine. As to the second 
question, the House of Lords did not feel it necessary to 
deal with this point, in view of its finding under the Spiliada 
doctrine. As to the third question, the House of Lords 
expressly rejected the US approach, evident in cases such 
as Bhopal, of weighing die public interests of the home and 
foreign forums in conducting the litigation. For a more 
detailed and extensive discussion of this issue see 
Muchlinski, 'Corporations in International Litigation: 
Problems of Jurisdiction and the United Kingdom 
Asbestos Case' (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly I.
The Existence of a Duty of Care
As noted in the introduction to this essay, none of the 
recent English cases involving MNE parent companies has 
yet determined the substantive question of liability for the 
acts of their overseas subsidiaries. Unless it settles, or is 
abandoned, before the trial date, the Cape litigation will be 
the first instance of this question to reach an English court 
for decision. It follows that the question of MNE group 
liability remains a speculative one (see further M 
Kamminga and S Zia-Zarifi (ed.), Liability of Multinational 
Corporations under International Law, Part III on US, English 
and Dutch approaches to such litigation. See also The 
Amoco Cadiz [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 304).
In Part I of this paper it was argued that a presumption of 
parent company liability for the acts of its owned and 
controlled overseas subsidiaries could be established in 
principle, subject to rebuttal by evidence negating control. It 
was further said that the main objection to this presumption 
is that it effectively undermines the vital principle of limited 
liability. In reply, it is arguable that too much is made of the 
need for limited liability between parent and subsidiary 
when they form part of an integrated economic entity, as has 
been pointed out by Professor Philip Blumberg, in his 
seminal work The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993):
'Under entity law and limited liability, each higher-tier 
company oJthe multitiered corporate group is insulated from 
liability for the unsatisfied debts of the lower tier companies of 
which it is a shareholder. In the multitiered group, there are, 
thus, as many layers of limited liability as there are tiers in 
corporate structure. Limited liability for corporate groups thus 
opens the door to multiple layers of insulation, a consequence 
unforeseen when limited liability was adopted long before the 
emergence of corporate groups', (p. 139)
When applied to involuntary creditors of die group, 
such as the victims of an alleged tort committed by the 
enterprise in the course of its operations, this extension of
limited liability does litde more dian shift the risk of 
liability onto diem and away from the group. Can this be a 
justifiable result when die victims are uninsured, as was the 
case with the Cape claimants? Even where the claimants 
are insured, can such a transfer of risk from corporation to 
involuntary creditor be justifiable, given the risk of moral 
hazard implicit in such a policy? In relation to the Cape 
case, it is not immediately obvious why the cost of dealing 
with asbestos-related injuries should be borne by the local 
subsidiary alone, especially where it does not have the 
assets from which to compensate the claimants, given that 
Cape closed down its asbestos operations in South Africa 
in 1979. On the other hand Cape has enjoyed the profit 
stream from those overseas investments, and it would 
seem proper to make those proceeds available to 
compensate involuntary creditors where they can show 
that the parent controlled the operations in South Africa, 
and so could be held responsible for them. In any case 
direct liability might be possible on the ground that as 
Cape was aware of the dangers of asbestos mining and 
milling, given the state of knowledge at the time these
o7 o o
activities were being carried on, and so any failure on its 
part to follow established safe practices, and, in particular, 
to require its South African subsidiaries to do so, would 
amount to a breach of a duty of care by omission (see 
further Lubbe et al. v Cape Pic House of Lords Claimants 
Final Served Case, at 43-50).
Therefore, the issues relating to the existence of a duty 
of care, and of its breach, could be kept separate from the 
wider issue relating to the extent to which the parent 
company could benefit from the principle of limited 
liability as a means of insulating itself against tort claims 
arising out of the actions of its subsidiaries. However, that
o
is a position entirely dependent on the particular facts of 
the case, and on whether there is sufficient proof of 
parental complicity in the alleged tort. It does not remove 
the broader question of whether the economic entity of 
the group as a whole should act as a source of funds for the 
compensation of involuntary creditors, and of whether 
there should be such a thing as 'multinational enterprise 
liability' based on the integrated nature of the 
transnational system of economic activities carried on by 
the MNE (see for example The Amoco Cadiz [1984] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 304, p. 338, paras. 43-46. See further 
Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, pp. 328- 
333. See also Halina Ward 'Governing Multinationals: The 
Role of Foreign Direct Liability', Royal Institute of 
International Affairs Briefing Paper New Series No. 18, 
February 2001). This matter will now be considered 
further in the light of the views of the Company Law 
Review Steering Group. ©
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